Attack tree (BGP and MP-BGP)¶
1. Compromise BGP/MP-BGP Routing [OR]
1.1 Initial Access & Infrastructure Compromise [OR]
1.1.1 Social Engineering & Phishing [OR]
1.1.1.1 Target network engineers with BGP config malware
1.1.1.2 Impersonate RIR staff for ROA manipulation
1.1.1.3 Fake vendor support requests for credential theft
1.1.2 Exploiting Management Interfaces [OR]
1.1.2.1 Exposed BGP monitoring systems (Grafana/Kibana)
1.1.2.2 Compromised SSH keys for router access
1.1.2.3 Default credentials on router admin interfaces
1.1.3 Supply Chain Attacks [OR]
1.1.3.1 Backdoored router firmware/images
1.1.3.2 Compromised IXP route server software
1.1.3.3 Malicious BGP optimization tools
1.2 BGP Protocol Attacks [OR]
1.2.1 Session Manipulation [OR]
1.2.1.1 TCP RST injection [AND]
|-> No TCP-AO/MD5 authentication
|-> On-path position
1.2.1.2 Keepalive timer exhaustion attacks
1.2.1.3 BGP session spoofing with forged source IPs
1.2.2 Update Flooding [OR]
1.2.2.1 Route flap storms (announce/withdraw)
1.2.2.2 Massive de-aggregation attacks
1.2.2.3 AS-path prepending storms
1.3 Persistence & Evasion [OR]
1.3.1 Route Poisoning [OR]
1.3.1.1 Selective route announcements during low traffic
1.3.1.2 Time-based hijacking (short-lived attacks)
1.3.1.3 Geographic-specific route manipulation
1.3.2 Detection Evasion [OR]
1.3.2.1 Mimicking legitimate AS-path patterns
1.3.2.2 Abuse of RPKI 'unknown' state
1.3.2.3 Leveraging peer conflicts for ambiguity
2. Protocol-Specific Attacks [OR]
2.1 Classic BGP (IPv4) Attacks [OR]
2.1.1 IPv4 Prefix Hijacking [OR]
2.1.1.1 Sub-prefix hijacking (more specific routes)
2.1.1.2 Exact-prefix hijacking with forged origin
2.1.1.3 Squatting unallocated IPv4 space
2.1.2 IPv4 Path Manipulation [OR]
2.1.2.1 AS-path prepending for traffic engineering
2.1.2.2 Ghost AS insertion for origin hiding
2.1.2.3 Community attribute abuse
2.1.3 IPv4 Infrastructure Attacks [OR]
2.1.3.1 Route reflector compromise
2.1.3.2 BGP router memory exhaustion
2.1.3.3 Max-prefix limit exploitation
2.2 MP-BGP Specific Attacks [OR]
2.2.1 Multiprotocol NLRl Attacks [OR]
2.2.1.1 VPNv4 route injection [AND]
|-> Route Distinguisher guessing/bruteforcing
|-> VPN label spoofing
2.2.1.2 EVPN MAC/IP advertisement spoofing
2.2.1.3 IPv6 next-hop poisoning
2.2.2 Address Family Exploitation [OR]
2.2.2.1 Rare AFI/SAFI flooding (e.g., multicast)
2.2.2.2 Cross-AFI contamination attacks
2.2.2.3 MP_REACH_NLRI attribute manipulation
2.2.3 MP-BGP Session Attacks [OR]
2.2.3.1 Capability negotiation exploitation
2.2.3.2 Multi-session AFI exhaustion
2.2.3.3 Extended community forgery
2.3 BGP-Agnostic Attacks [OR]
2.3.1 RPKI Infrastructure Attacks [OR]
2.3.1.1 RTR (RPKI-to-Router) protocol exploitation
2.3.1.2 ROA expiration/time manipulation
2.3.1.3 RIR portal compromise for ROA creation
2.3.2 DDoS Amplification [OR]
2.3.2.1 BGP update reflection/amplification
2.3.2.2 Route server DDoS via query flooding
2.3.2.3 Looking glass abuse for amplification
2.3.3 Cryptographic Attacks [OR]
2.3.3.1 BGPsec key compromise
2.3.3.2 TCP-AO hash collision attacks
2.3.3.3 RPKI certificate chain exploitation
3. Cross-Protocol & Composite Attacks [OR]
3.1 BGP + DNS Attacks [OR]
3.1.1 Recursive resolver hijacking [AND]
|-> BGP prefix hijack
|-> DNS poisoning/compromise
3.1.2 Authoritative NS redirect [AND]
|-> Nameserver prefix hijack
|-> DNSSEC compromise
3.2 BGP + CDN/Cloud Attacks [OR]
3.2.1 Anycast prefix hijacking [AND]
|-> CDN edge node hijack
|-> SSL certificate forgery
3.2.2 Cloud region isolation [AND]
|-> Regional prefix hijack
|-> Tenant isolation bypass
3.3 AI-Powered Attacks [OR]
3.3.1 ML-Generated Path Forgery
3.3.2 Autonomous hijack coordination
3.3.3 Adaptive persistence mechanisms
Risk table¶
Attack Path |
Technical Complexity |
Resources Required |
Risk Level |
Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|
1.1.1.1 Target network engineers with BGP config malware |
High |
Medium |
High |
Needs social engineering and malware development. |
1.1.1.2 Impersonate RIR staff for ROA manipulation |
High |
Medium |
High |
Phishing or spoofing regulatory staff; targeted. |
1.1.1.3 Fake vendor support requests for credential theft |
Medium |
Low |
Medium |
Social engineering; depends on human error. |
1.1.2.1 Exposed BGP monitoring systems (Grafana/Kibana) |
Medium |
Low |
Medium |
Requires scanning and access; opportunistic. |
1.1.2.2 Compromised SSH keys for router access |
High |
Medium |
High |
Accessing routers; advanced network knowledge needed. |
1.1.2.3 Default credentials on router admin interfaces |
Low |
Low |
Medium |
Simple but high impact if not patched. |
1.1.3.1 Backdoored router firmware/images |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
Supply chain compromise; difficult but extremely impactful. |
1.1.3.2 Compromised IXP route server software |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
Infrastructure-level attack; sophisticated. |
1.1.3.3 Malicious BGP optimization tools |
High |
Medium |
High |
Requires targeted deployment to operators. |
1.2.1.1 TCP RST injection |
High |
High |
High |
Requires on-path access and no authentication. |
1.2.1.2 Keepalive timer exhaustion attacks |
Medium |
Medium |
Medium |
Automated attack; moderately difficult. |
1.2.1.3 BGP session spoofing with forged source IPs |
High |
Medium |
High |
Needs control over traffic path; complex. |
1.2.2.1 Route flap storms |
High |
Medium |
High |
Large-scale announcement/withdraw attacks. |
1.2.2.2 Massive de-aggregation attacks |
High |
Medium |
High |
Disrupts routing tables; technical skill required. |
1.2.2.3 AS-path prepending storms |
Medium |
Medium |
Medium |
Moderately disruptive; requires coordination. |
1.3.1.1 Selective route announcements during low traffic |
Medium |
Low |
Medium |
Timing-sensitive manipulation; moderate skill. |
1.3.1.2 Time-based hijacking (short-lived attacks) |
High |
Medium |
High |
Requires precise timing; stealthy. |
1.3.1.3 Geographic-specific route manipulation |
High |
Medium |
High |
Knowledge of regional routing; targeted impact. |
1.3.2.1 Mimicking legitimate AS-path patterns |
High |
Medium |
High |
Evades detection; requires routing expertise. |
1.3.2.2 Abuse of RPKI ‘unknown’ state |
Medium |
Medium |
Medium |
Exploits protocol ambiguity; moderate skill. |
1.3.2.3 Leveraging peer conflicts for ambiguity |
Medium |
Medium |
Medium |
Relies on network relationships; moderate effort. |
2.1.1.1 Sub-prefix hijacking |
High |
Medium |
High |
Diverts traffic for targeted prefixes; technical skill required. |
2.1.1.2 Exact-prefix hijacking with forged origin |
High |
Medium |
High |
Highly disruptive; requires forged announcements. |
2.1.1.3 Squatting unallocated IPv4 space |
Medium |
Medium |
Medium |
Opportunistic; requires routing control. |
2.1.2.1 AS-path prepending for traffic engineering |
Medium |
Low |
Medium |
Low-cost traffic manipulation; detectable. |
2.1.2.2 Ghost AS insertion for origin hiding |
High |
Medium |
High |
Advanced; hides origin in AS-path. |
2.1.2.3 Community attribute abuse |
Medium |
Low |
Medium |
Manipulates routing preferences; moderate impact. |
2.1.3.1 Route reflector compromise |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
Infrastructure-level; highly technical. |
2.1.3.2 BGP router memory exhaustion |
High |
Medium |
High |
Denial-of-service via resource exhaustion. |
2.1.3.3 Max-prefix limit exploitation |
Medium |
Medium |
Medium |
Moderate disruption; needs misconfiguration. |
2.2.1.1 VPNv4 route injection |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
Requires RD guessing and label spoofing; advanced. |
2.2.1.2 EVPN MAC/IP advertisement spoofing |
High |
Medium |
High |
Targeted virtual network attack; technical. |
2.2.1.3 IPv6 next-hop poisoning |
High |
Medium |
High |
Advanced manipulation; moderate resources. |
2.2.2.1 Rare AFI/SAFI flooding |
High |
Medium |
High |
Exploits uncommon address families; sophisticated. |
2.2.2.2 Cross-AFI contamination attacks |
High |
Medium |
High |
Complex manipulation; needs network knowledge. |
2.2.2.3 MP_REACH_NLRI attribute manipulation |
High |
Medium |
High |
Technical; affects multi-protocol routing. |
2.2.3.1 Capability negotiation exploitation |
High |
Medium |
High |
Requires session-level manipulation. |
2.2.3.2 Multi-session AFI exhaustion |
High |
Medium |
High |
Resource-intensive; complex. |
2.2.3.3 Extended community forgery |
High |
Medium |
High |
Advanced routing attack; targeted. |
2.3.1.1 RTR protocol exploitation |
High |
Medium |
High |
Exploits RPKI infrastructure; technical. |
2.3.1.2 ROA expiration/time manipulation |
Medium |
Medium |
Medium |
Relies on timing; moderate impact. |
2.3.1.3 RIR portal compromise for ROA creation |
High |
High |
High |
Needs access to RIR systems; very impactful. |
2.3.2.1 BGP update reflection/amplification |
High |
Medium |
High |
Can be used for DDoS amplification; sophisticated. |
2.3.2.2 Route server DDoS via query flooding |
Medium |
Medium |
Medium |
Moderate-scale amplification; network access needed. |
2.3.2.3 Looking glass abuse for amplification |
Medium |
Low |
Medium |
Opportunistic; low-resource attack. |
2.3.3.1 BGPsec key compromise |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
High-impact cryptographic attack; highly technical. |
2.3.3.2 TCP-AO hash collision attacks |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
Advanced crypto attack; rare but severe. |
2.3.3.3 RPKI certificate chain exploitation |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
Cryptographic exploitation; complex and high-risk. |
3.1.1 Recursive resolver hijacking |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
Requires BGP hijack + DNS compromise; complex. |
3.1.2 Authoritative NS redirect |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
Combination of routing and DNSSEC compromise; highly technical. |
3.2.1 Anycast prefix hijacking |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
CDN edge and certificate forgery; very resource intensive. |
3.2.2 Cloud region isolation |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
Regional routing + tenant isolation; extremely difficult. |
3.3.1 ML-generated path forgery |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
AI-assisted routing attacks; cutting-edge. |
3.3.2 Autonomous hijack coordination |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
Coordinated AI attacks; highly sophisticated. |
3.3.3 Adaptive persistence mechanisms |
Very High |
High |
Very High |
Self-adjusting attacks; very hard to detect and mitigate. |