IPv4 path manipulation¶
Attack Pattern¶
IPv4 path manipulation involves altering the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) path attributes to maliciously influence routing decisions across the internet. By exploiting BGP’s trust-based nature, attackers can redirect traffic through unauthorized paths, create routing loops, or implement denial-of-service conditions.
1. IPv4 Path Manipulation [OR]
1.1 AS Path Attribute Manipulation [OR]
1.1.1 AS Path Prepending
1.1.1.1 Adding fake AS segments to make paths appear longer
1.1.1.2 Strategic prepending to influence route selection
1.1.1.3 Multi-hop prepending for extended manipulation
1.1.2 AS Path Shortening
1.1.2.1 Forging shorter AS paths to attract traffic
1.1.2.2 Removing legitimate AS segments from paths
1.1.2.3 Creating fake optimal paths through path truncation
1.1.3 AS Path Poisoning
1.1.3.1 Inserting non-existent AS numbers
1.1.3.2 Using reserved or private AS numbers in paths
1.1.3.3 Creating invalid AS path sequences
1.2 BGP Community Attribute Abuse [OR]
1.2.1 Community-Based Traffic Engineering
1.2.1.1 Manipulating traffic flow using community attributes
1.2.1.2 Exploiting provider-specific community meanings
1.2.1.3 Unauthorized use of no-export and other communities
1.2.2 Blackhole Community Manipulation
1.2.2.1 Illegitimately tagging routes with blackhole communities
1.2.2.2 Creating denial-of-service through route blackholing
1.2.2.3 Exploiting provider blackhole infrastructure
1.2.3 QoS Community Exploitation
1.2.3.1 Manipulating quality of service through communities
1.2.3.2 Priority manipulation for traffic classes
1.2.3.3 Bandwidth allocation abuse
1.3 MED (Multi-Exit Discriminator) Manipulation [OR]
1.3.1 MED Attribute Forgery
1.3.1.1 Setting artificial MED values to influence path selection
1.3.1.2 Exploiting MED comparison rules between different ASs
1.3.1.3 Creating preferential exit point selection
1.3.2 MED-Based Traffic Steering
1.3.2.1 Redirecting traffic to specific interconnection points
1.3.2.2 Manipulating inbound traffic engineering
1.3.2.3 Exploiting multi-homed network configurations
1.4 Next-Hop Manipulation [OR]
1.4.1 Next-Hop Attribute Spoofing
1.4.1.1 Forging next-hop addresses to redirect traffic
1.4.1.2 Using unreachable next-hops for blackholing
1.4.1.3 Creating routing loops through next-hop manipulation
1.4.2 Third-Party Next-Hop Abuse
1.4.2.1 Specifying unauthorized third-party next-hops
1.4.2.2 Exploiting next-hop-self configurations
1.4.2.3 Using next-hop to bypass security policies
1.5 Origin Attribute Manipulation [OR]
1.5.1 Origin Type Forgery
1.5.1.1 Changing origin attribute from IGP to EGP or INCOMPLETE
1.5.1.2 Exploiting origin type preferences in path selection
1.5.1.3 Manipulating route authenticity through origin changes
1.5.2 False Origin AS Claims
1.5.2.1 Claiming origin from unauthorized AS numbers
1.5.2.2 Using hijacked or revoked AS numbers
1.5.2.3 Origin spoofing for false attribution
1.6 Weight and Local Preference Abuse [OR]
1.6.1 Local Preference Manipulation
1.6.1.1 Illegitimately setting high local preference values
1.6.1.2 Influencing outbound traffic flow through local pref
1.6.1.3 Creating routing inconsistencies within AS
1.6.2 Weight Attribute Exploitation
1.6.2.1 Manipulating Cisco-specific weight attribute
1.6.2.2 Creating preferred paths through weight manipulation
1.6.2.3 Bypassing normal BGP decision process
1.7 Route Reflection Manipulation [OR]
1.7.1 Rogue Route Reflector
1.7.1.1 Compromising route reflector infrastructure
1.7.1.2 Injecting malicious routes through reflectors
1.7.1.3 Exploiting reflector cluster configurations
1.7.2 Reflection Path Manipulation
1.7.2.1 Altering paths through reflector hierarchies
1.7.2.2 Creating routing inconsistencies via reflection
1.7.2.3 Exploiting reflection for path hiding
1.8 Aggregation and Deaggregation Attacks [OR]
1.8.1 Route Aggregation Abuse
1.8.1.1 Creating overly broad aggregate announcements
1.8.1.2 Aggregating unauthorized prefixes
1.8.1.3 Using aggregation to hide more specific routes
1.8.2 Deaggregation Attacks
1.8.2.1 Announcing deaggregated routes for hijacking
1.8.2.2 Creating route fragmentation through deaggregation
1.8.2.3 Exploiting deaggregation for traffic interception
Why it works¶
Trust-Based Protocol: BGP operates on mutual trust between peers without inherent authentication
Attribute Flexibility: BGP’s extensive attribute set provides multiple manipulation vectors
Global Scale: Internet routing complexity makes detection difficult
Slow Convergence: BGP’s slow convergence allows malicious paths to persist
Implementation Variability: Different vendor implementations handle attributes inconsistently
Limited Validation: Many networks lack comprehensive path validation mechanisms
Mitigation¶
BGP Path Validation¶
Action: Implement path validation using RPKI and BGPsec
How:
Deploy RPKI for route origin validation
Implement BGPsec for path validation where supported
Use AS_PATH verification tools and services
Configuration Example (BGPsec, cisco):
router bgp 65001
bgp sec enabled
neighbor 192.0.2.1 bgpsec enable
Attribute filtering policies¶
Action: Implement strict attribute filtering and validation
How:
Filter unexpected AS_PATH segments
Validate community attributes against policy
Sanitize MED values from external peers
Configuration example:
route-map EXTERNAL-IN permit 10
match as-path 100
set community no-export
ip as-path access-list 100 deny _65500_
Route monitoring and analysis¶
Action: Continuously monitor BGP paths for anomalies
How:
Implement BGP monitoring tools (BGPStream, ExaBGP)
Set up real-time alerting for path changes
Conduct regular path analysis and auditing
Tools: BGPMon, RIPE Stat, and commercial monitoring solutions
Peer authentication and validation¶
Action: Strengthen BGP peer authentication and validation
How:
Implement BGP MD5 authentication
Validate peer AS numbers and prefixes
Use prefix limits and rate limiting
Configuration example:
neighbor 192.0.2.1 password BGP-P@ssw0rd
neighbor 192.0.2.1 maximum-prefix 1000
Traffic engineering controls¶
Action: Implement controls for legitimate traffic engineering
How:
Document and audit all traffic engineering changes
Implement change control procedures
Monitor for unauthorized engineering activities
Best Practice: Maintain traffic engineering documentation
Incident response planning¶
Action: Develop specific response procedures for path manipulation
How:
Create incident response playbooks for BGP incidents
Establish communication channels with peers
Practice path manipulation response scenarios
Template: Maintain updated contact lists and procedures
MANRS Compliance¶
Action: Implement Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security
How:
Participate in MANRS initiative
Implement MANRS actions for network operators
Promote MANRS adoption among peers
Benefits: Improved routing security and industry collaboration