Security Association manipulation attacks¶

1. Security association (SA) manipulation [OR]

    1.1 SA replay attacks [OR]

        1.1.1 Sequence number reset [AND]
            1.1.1.1 Reset ESP or IKE sequence counters
            1.1.1.2 Replay previously captured packets [AND]
                1.1.1.2.1 Inject encrypted payloads
                1.1.1.2.2 Observe victim acceptance/rejection

        1.1.2 Anti-replay window manipulation [AND]
            1.1.2.1 Burst traffic to advance window
            1.1.2.2 Force acceptance of delayed/replayed packets [AND]
                1.1.2.2.1 Exploit implementation tolerance
                1.1.2.2.2 Trigger replay or sequence gaps

        1.1.3 ESP sequence number cycle attacks [AND]
            1.1.3.1 Exploit 32-bit rollover
            1.1.3.2 Replay packets after rollover [AND]
                1.1.3.2.1 Predict sequence continuation
                1.1.3.2.2 Cause acceptance of repeated ciphertext

        1.1.4 IKE message replay [AND]
            1.1.4.1 Replay expired IKE_SA messages
            1.1.4.2 Recreate expired security associations [AND]
                1.1.4.2.1 Exploit session renegotiation behaviour
                1.1.4.2.2 Bypass replay protection if misconfigured

    1.2 SA parameter corruption [OR]

        1.2.1 SPI collision attacks [AND]
            1.2.1.1 Craft colliding SPI values
            1.2.1.2 Cause misrouting or misassociation of SAs [AND]
                1.2.1.2.1 Redirect traffic to attacker-controlled SA
                1.2.1.2.2 Exploit implementation lookup ambiguities

        1.2.2 Cryptographic algorithm parameter manipulation [AND]
            1.2.2.1 Alter negotiated algorithms
            1.2.2.2 Force weaker encryption or authentication [AND]
                1.2.2.2.1 Exploit victim’s algorithm preference logic
                1.2.2.2.2 Induce fallback to vulnerable cipher suites

        1.2.3 Key length downgrade [AND]
            1.2.3.1 Negotiate shorter keys than intended
            1.2.3.2 Exploit protocol negotiation gaps [AND]
                1.2.3.2.1 Use crafted SA proposals
                1.2.3.2.2 Trigger weak key acceptance in victim

        1.2.4 SA policy field corruption [AND]
            1.2.4.1 Modify policy attributes in SA messages
            1.2.4.2 Bypass filters or restrictions [AND]
                1.2.4.2.1 Exploit weak validation checks
                1.2.4.2.2 Force acceptance of otherwise blocked traffic

    1.3 SA lifetime exhaustion [OR]

        1.3.1 Rapid SA rekeying attacks [AND]
            1.3.1.1 Trigger frequent rekey events
            1.3.1.2 Exhaust cryptographic resources [AND]
                1.3.1.2.1 Force CPU-intensive key generation
                1.3.1.2.2 Cause service degradation

        1.3.2 Child SA flood attacks [AND]
            1.3.2.1 Create multiple simultaneous child SAs
            1.3.2.2 Overwhelm state tables [AND]
                1.3.2.2.1 Exploit maximum table capacity
                1.3.2.2.2 Induce SA management failures

        1.3.3 IKE_SA_INIT spoofed floods [AND]
            1.3.3.1 Send INIT messages with forged source addresses
            1.3.3.2 Consume SA allocation resources [AND]
                1.3.3.2.1 Prevent legitimate session establishment
                1.3.3.2.2 Trigger fallback or denial-of-service

        1.3.4 Persistent half-open SAs [AND]
            1.3.4.1 Maintain incomplete SA negotiations
            1.3.4.2 Exhaust state table entries [AND]
                1.3.4.2.1 Exploit timeout behaviour
                1.3.4.2.2 Reduce effective capacity for valid SAs

    1.4 SA selection algorithm abuse [OR]

        1.4.1 SPI selection attacks [AND]
            1.4.1.1 Predict or influence SPI assignment
            1.4.1.2 Force collisions or precomputed mapping [AND]
                1.4.1.2.1 Exploit deterministic SPI allocation
                1.4.1.2.2 Redirect traffic or confuse victim state

        1.4.2 Policy-based selection bypass [AND]
            1.4.2.1 Use crafted traffic patterns
            1.4.2.2 Circumvent policy-based SA selection [AND]
                1.4.2.2.1 Exploit implementation shortcuts
                1.4.2.2.2 Force weaker or unintended SA choice

        1.4.3 Multi-SA environment confusion [AND]
            1.4.3.1 Inject multiple SAs simultaneously
            1.4.3.2 Confuse victim selection logic [AND]
                1.4.3.2.1 Exploit priority resolution gaps
                1.4.3.2.2 Cause weaker SA to be used inadvertently

        1.4.4 SA priority manipulation [AND]
            1.4.4.1 Adjust negotiation or selection values
            1.4.4.2 Force weaker SA preference [AND]
                1.4.4.2.1 Exploit priority rules in multi-SA systems
                1.4.4.2.2 Reduce overall session security