Attack tree (TCP)

1. Compromise BGP via TCP Vulnerabilities [OR]

    1.1 Exploit TCP Stack on BGP Router [OR]
    
        1.1.1 Remote Code Execution (RCE) via TCP/IP flaws
            1.1.1.1 Exploit router OS TCP stack (JunOS, IOS XR flaws)
            1.1.1.2 Kernel memory corruption (SACK-based attacks, CVE-2019-11477)
            1.1.1.3 Deploy malicious BGP configurations post-exploit
            
        1.1.2 Denial of Service via TCP [OR]
            1.1.2.1 TCP SACK resource exhaustion
            1.1.2.2 TCP SYN flood to exhaust BGP peer resources
            1.1.2.3 Trigger kernel crashes through crafted TCP packets
            
    1.2 BGP Session Manipulation [OR]
    
        1.2.1 Session Establishment Attacks [OR]
            1.2.1.1 TCP SYN flood attack
            1.2.1.2 Exploit BGP's MD5 authentication weaknesses
            1.2.1.3 Bypass MD5 via TCP session hijacking
            
        1.2.2 Active Session Hijacking [AND]
            1.2.2.1 Predict BGP TCP sequence numbers [OR]
                |-> Off-path ISN prediction using timestamp leaks
                |-> In-window guessing due to poor ISN randomization
            1.2.2.2 Inject malicious BGP updates [OR]
                |-> Spoofed route advertisements
                |-> Crafted AS_PATH manipulation
                |-> Route flap storms (announce/withdraw)
            
        1.2.3 Session Persistence Abuse [OR]
            1.2.3.1 Force BGP session resets via TCP attacks [AND]
                |-> Inject RST packets (precision spoofing)
                |-> Exploit TCP keepalive timeouts
            1.2.3.2 Subvert BGP graceful restart [OR]
                |-> Spoof graceful restart capabilities
                |-> Exhaust router memory during recovery
            
    1.3 Man-in-the-Middle BGP Sessions [AND]
    
        1.3.1 Traffic Interception [OR]
            1.3.1.1 ARP/DNS spoofing to redirect BGP traffic
            1.3.1.2 BGP peering over unencrypted links (IXPs)
            1.3.1.3 On-path position for packet capture
            
        1.3.2 Message Manipulation [OR]
            1.3.2.1 Decrypt or modify BGP messages
            1.3.2.2 Downgrade TCP-MD5 to plaintext (if misconfigured)
            1.3.2.3 Exploit missing TCP-AO (Authentication Option)
            1.3.2.4 Bypass TCP-AO protection [AND]
                |-> Key extraction from compromised router
                |-> Cryptographic weakness exploitation
                |-> Implementation-specific vulnerabilities
            
    1.4 Protocol-Level TCP Attacks [OR]
    
        1.4.1 Connection Hijacking [AND]
            1.4.1.1 Off-path sequence number prediction
            1.4.1.2 Malicious packet injection (RST/FIN spoofing)
            
        1.4.2 Amplification/Reflection Attacks [OR]
            1.4.2.1 TCP middlebox reflection
            1.4.2.2 ACK/PSH flood abuse
            1.4.2.3 BGP update reflection/amplification
            
    1.5 Off-Path & Side-Channel Attacks [AND]
    
        1.5.1 Blind In-Window Exploit [OR]
            1.5.1.1 NAT slipstreaming variants
            1.5.1.2 Protocol downgrade attacks (QUIC-to-TCP)
            
        1.5.2 Side-Channel Data Extraction [OR]
            1.5.2.1 TCP timestamp analysis
            1.5.2.2 Application data correlation
            1.5.2.3 Encrypted traffic classification
            
    1.6 Cloud/Middlebox-Specific Attacks [OR]
    
        1.6.1 Bypass Cloud Load Balancers [AND]
            1.6.1.1 Crafted TCP segmentation evasion
            1.6.1.2 Instance resource exhaustion
            
        1.6.2 Stateful Firewall Evasion [OR]
            1.6.2.1 TCP Fast Open (TFO) cache poisoning
            1.6.2.2 Fragmentation overlap attacks
            1.6.2.3 Evade BGP monitoring systems
            
    1.7 AI/ML-Enhanced TCP Attacks [AND]
    
        1.7.1 Traffic Fingerprinting [OR]
            1.7.1.1 Encrypted traffic classification
            1.7.1.2 SCADA system detection via flow patterns
            1.7.1.3 BGP peer behaviour analysis
            
        1.7.2 Adversarial Traffic Generation [OR]
            1.7.2.1 GAN-based normal traffic modelling
            1.7.2.2 Stealthy DDoS payload synthesis
            1.7.2.3 ML-generated TCP sequence prediction
            
2. Composite BGP/TCP Attack Vectors [OR]

    2.1 BGP + TCP Stack Exploitation [OR]
    
        2.1.1 Router OS Compromise [AND]
            2.1.1.1 TCP stack vulnerability exploitation
            2.1.1.2 Persistent BGP route manipulation
            
        2.1.2 Kernel-Level Attacks [OR]
            2.1.2.1 Memory corruption via crafted TCP options
            2.1.2.2 Resource exhaustion attacks
            2.1.2.3 BGP process isolation bypass
            
    2.2 Session Integrity Attacks [OR]
    
        2.2.1 Cryptographic Weaknesses [OR]
            2.2.1.1 TCP-MD5 hash cracking (weak keys)
            2.2.1.2 TCP-AO hash collision attacks
            2.2.1.3 RPKI certificate chain exploitation
            2.2.1.4 TCP-AO key compromise through side-channels
            2.2.1.5 Algorithm vulnerability exploitation (SHA-1/256)
            
        2.2.2 Protocol Downgrade Attacks [AND]
            2.2.2.1 Force plaintext BGP sessions
            2.2.2.2 Exploit missing authentication
            2.2.2.3 Session negotiation manipulation
            2.2.2.4 TCP-AO fallback mechanism exploitation
            
    2.3 Network Infrastructure Attacks [OR]
    
        2.3.1 IXP and Route Server Targeting [OR]
            2.3.1.1 Compromised IXP route server software
            2.3.1.2 BGP peering link interception
            2.3.1.3 Route reflector compromise
            
        2.3.2 Management Interface Exploitation [OR]
            2.3.2.1 Exposed BGP monitoring systems
            2.3.2.2 Compromised SSH keys for router access
            2.3.2.3 Default credentials on admin interfaces
            2.3.2.4 TCP-AO key material theft through config leaks
            
    2.4 Advanced Persistence Mechanisms [OR]
    
        2.4.1 Stealthy Route Manipulation [OR]
            2.4.1.1 Time-based hijacking (short-lived attacks)
            2.4.1.2 Geographic-specific route manipulation
            2.4.1.3 Mimicking legitimate AS-path patterns
            
        2.4.2 Detection Evasion [OR]
            2.4.2.1 Abuse of RPKI 'unknown' state
            2.4.2.2 Leveraging peer conflicts for ambiguity
            2.4.2.3 Adaptive attack timing based on network monitoring
            
3. Cross-Protocol Attack Chains [OR]

    3.1 Multi-Vector BGP/TCP Compromise [OR]
    
        3.1.1 Chained Exploitation [AND]
            3.1.1.1 Initial access via TCP stack vulnerability
            3.1.1.2 Privilege escalation to BGP process
            3.1.1.3 Persistent route manipulation
            3.1.1.4 TCP-AO key material extraction
            
        3.1.2 Coordinated Attacks [OR]
            3.1.2.1 Distributed TCP sequence prediction
            3.1.2.2 Synchronised BGP session reset attacks
            3.1.2.3 Cross-platform exploitation campaigns
            
    3.2 AI-Powered TCP/BGP Attacks [OR]
    
        3.2.1 ML-Generated Attack Traffic
        3.2.2 Autonomous hijack coordination
        3.2.3 Adaptive persistence mechanisms
        3.2.4 Evolutionary path optimization
        3.2.5 AI-enhanced TCP-AO cryptographic attacks
        
    3.3 Supply Chain Compromise [OR]
    
        3.3.1 Backdoored router firmware/images
        3.3.2 Malicious BGP optimization tools
        3.3.3 Compromised network management software
        3.3.4 Pre-installed weak TCP-AO keys in vendor equipment

Nitty gritty risk table

Attack Path

Technical Complexity

Resources Required

Risk Level

Notes

1.1.1.1 Exploit router OS TCP stack (JunOS, IOS XR flaws)

High

Medium

High

Requires knowledge of specific vendor vulnerabilities; can lead to full device compromise.

1.1.1.2 Kernel memory corruption (SACK-based attacks, CVE-2019-11477)

High

Low

High

Exploits known vulnerabilities in TCP SACK processing; can cause RCE or DoS.

1.1.1.3 Deploy malicious BGP configurations post-exploit

Medium

Low

High

After initial access, modifies BGP settings to manipulate routing.

1.1.2.1 TCP SACK resource exhaustion

Medium

Low

Medium

Consumes router resources through crafted SACK packets; can lead to DoS.

1.1.2.2 TCP SYN flood to exhaust BGP peer resources

Low

High

High

Floods BGP peers with SYN packets; disrupts session establishment.

1.1.2.3 Trigger kernel crashes through crafted TCP packets

High

Low

High

Sends malformed TCP packets to crash the kernel; causes service disruption.

1.2.1.1 TCP SYN flood attack

Low

High

Medium

Basic DoS attack against BGP session establishment; easily detectable.

1.2.1.2 Exploit BGP’s MD5 authentication weaknesses

Medium

Low

High

Weak MD5 keys or implementations can be cracked or bypassed.

1.2.1.3 Bypass MD5 via TCP session hijacking

High

Medium

High

Hijacks TCP session to avoid MD5 authentication; requires sequence prediction.

1.2.2.1 Predict BGP TCP sequence numbers

High

Low

High

Predicts sequence numbers to inject malicious packets; off-path or in-window.

1.2.2.2 Inject malicious BGP updates

Medium

Low

Very High

Injects fraudulent routes, AS_PATH manipulations, or route flaps to disrupt routing.

1.2.3.1 Force BGP session resets via TCP attacks

Medium

Low

High

Injects RST packets or exploits timeouts to drop BGP sessions.

1.2.3.2 Subvert BGP graceful restart

High

Low

High

Spoofs graceful restart or exhausts memory during recovery to cause prolonged outages.

1.3.1.1 ARP/DNS spoofing to redirect BGP traffic

Medium

Low

High

Redirects BGP traffic to attacker-in-the-middle; requires local network access.

1.3.1.2 BGP peering over unencrypted links (IXPs)

Low

Low

High

Eavesdrops on unencrypted BGP sessions at exchange points; easy interception.

1.3.1.3 On-path position for packet capture

High

Medium

Very High

Attacker positioned on network path can capture and manipulate BGP traffic.

1.3.2.1 Decrypt or modify BGP messages

Very High

High

Very High

Decrypts BGP messages if encryption is weak or compromised; alters routing updates.

1.3.2.2 Downgrade TCP-MD5 to plaintext

Medium

Low

High

Forces fallback to unencrypted sessions if misconfigured.

1.3.2.3 Exploit missing TCP-AO

Medium

Low

High

Targets sessions without TCP-AO authentication; easier to manipulate.

1.3.2.4 Bypass TCP-AO protection

Very High

High

Very High

Extracts keys, exploits crypto weaknesses, or implementation flaws to bypass TCP-AO.

1.4.1.1 Off-path sequence number prediction

High

Low

High

Predicts TCP sequence numbers without being on-path; requires timing or leaks.

1.4.1.2 Malicious packet injection (RST/FIN spoofing)

Medium

Low

Medium

Injects RST or FIN packets to disrupt connections; can be used against BGP sessions.

1.4.2.1 TCP middlebox reflection

High

Medium

High

Uses middleboxes to reflect and amplify TCP traffic; can target BGP peers.

1.4.2.2 ACK/PSH flood abuse

Medium

High

Medium

Floods with ACK or PSH packets to consume resources; may impact BGP performance.

1.4.2.3 BGP update reflection/amplification

High

Medium

High

Reflects and amplifies BGP updates to overwhelm peers or fabricate routes.

1.5.1.1 NAT slipstreaming variants

High

Low

High

Exploits NAT devices to inject packets; can be used to manipulate BGP sessions.

1.5.1.2 Protocol downgrade attacks (QUIC-to-TCP)

High

Low

Medium

Forces downgrade to TCP to exploit vulnerabilities; less common for BGP.

1.5.2.1 TCP timestamp analysis

Medium

Low

Medium

Analyses timestamps to infer information about hosts or networks.

1.5.2.2 Application data correlation

High

Low

Medium

Correlates TCP data with BGP applications to identify vulnerabilities.

1.5.2.3 Encrypted traffic classification

High

Medium

Medium

Uses ML to classify encrypted BGP traffic; reconnaissance for further attacks.

1.6.1.1 Crafted TCP segmentation evasion

High

Low

High

Evades cloud load balancers using TCP segmentation tricks; can target BGP speakers.

1.6.1.2 Instance resource exhaustion

Medium

High

High

Exhausts resources of cloud instances hosting BGP; causes DoS.

1.6.2.1 TCP Fast Open (TFO) cache poisoning

High

Low

High

Poisons TFO caches to bypass security or inject packets into BGP sessions.

1.6.2.2 Fragmentation overlap attacks

High

Low

High

Uses overlapping fragments to evade firewalls or IDS; can target BGP.

1.6.2.3 Evade BGP monitoring systems

High

Low

High

Uses evasion techniques to avoid detection by BGP monitoring tools.

1.7.1.1 Encrypted traffic classification

Very High

High

Medium

AI classifies encrypted BGP traffic for reconnaissance or targeting.

1.7.1.2 SCADA system detection via flow patterns

Very High

High

High

Identifies SCADA systems using BGP for critical infrastructure targeting.

1.7.1.3 BGP peer behaviour analysis

Very High

High

High

AI analyses BGP peer behavior to identify weaknesses or opportunities for attack.

1.7.2.1 GAN-based normal traffic modelling

Very High

High

Very High

Generates realistic traffic to evade detection during BGP attacks.

1.7.2.2 Stealthy DDoS payload synthesis

Very High

High

Very High

AI creates DDoS payloads that mimic legitimate BGP traffic for stealthy attacks.

1.7.2.3 ML-generated TCP sequence prediction

Very High

High

Very High

AI predicts TCP sequences for precise injection into BGP sessions.

2.1.1.1 TCP stack vulnerability exploitation

High

Medium

High

Combines TCP exploits with BGP manipulation for persistent access.

2.1.1.2 Persistent BGP route manipulation

Medium

Low

Very High

After compromising OS, modifies BGP routes for long-term control.

2.1.2.1 Memory corruption via crafted TCP options

Very High

Low

High

Uses TCP options to corrupt memory and compromise BGP processes.

2.1.2.2 Resource exhaustion attacks

Medium

High

High

Exhausts kernel resources to disrupt BGP operations.

2.1.2.3 BGP process isolation bypass

High

Low

High

Escapes process isolation to manipulate BGP directly from kernel.

2.2.1.1 TCP-MD5 hash cracking (weak keys)

Medium

Low

High

Cracks weak MD5 keys used in BGP authentication.

2.2.1.2 TCP-AO hash collision attacks

Very High

High

Very High

Exploits hash collisions in TCP-AO to bypass authentication.

2.2.1.3 RPKI certificate chain exploitation

High

Medium

High

Compromises RPKI certificates to validate fraudulent BGP routes.

2.2.1.4 TCP-AO key compromise through side-channels

Very High

High

Very High

Uses side-channels to extract TCP-AO keys from compromised routers.

2.2.1.5 Algorithm vulnerability exploitation (SHA-1/256)

Very High

High

Very High

Exploits weaknesses in SHA-1 or SHA-256 used in BGP security.

2.2.2.1 Force plaintext BGP sessions

Medium

Low

High

Downgrades sessions to plaintext to eavesdrop or manipulate.

2.2.2.2 Exploit missing authentication

Low

Low

Medium

Targets BGP sessions with no authentication; easy to manipulate.

2.2.2.3 Session negotiation manipulation

High

Low

High

Manipulates session setup to weaken security or force vulnerabilities.

2.2.2.4 TCP-AO fallback mechanism exploitation

High

Low

High

Exploits fallback mechanisms to bypass TCP-AO authentication.

2.3.1.1 Compromised IXP route server software

High

Medium

Very High

Compromises software at IXPs to manipulate routing for multiple networks.

2.3.1.2 BGP peering link interception

High

Medium

Very High

Intercepts peering links at IXPs to manipulate or eavesdrop on BGP.

2.3.1.3 Route reflector compromise

High

Medium

Very High

Compromises route reflectors to inject malicious routes into large networks.

2.3.2.1 Exposed BGP monitoring systems

Low

Low

Medium

Accesses exposed monitoring systems to gather intelligence or disrupt operations.

2.3.2.2 Compromised SSH keys for router access

Medium

Low

High

Uses stolen SSH keys to access and manipulate BGP routers.

2.3.2.3 Default credentials on admin interfaces

Low

Low

High

Uses default credentials to gain access to router management interfaces.

2.3.2.4 TCP-AO key material theft through config leaks

Medium

Low

High

Steals TCP-AO keys from leaked configuration files or backups.

2.4.1.1 Time-based hijacking (short-lived attacks)

High

Low

High

Announces fraudulent routes for short periods to avoid detection.

2.4.1.2 Geographic-specific route manipulation

High

Low

High

Targets specific regions with route manipulations to localize impact.

2.4.1.3 Mimicking legitimate AS-path patterns

High

Low

High

Copies legitimate AS-paths to make fraudulent routes appear valid.

2.4.2.1 Abuse of RPKI ‘unknown’ state

Medium

Low

Medium

Exploits routes with unknown RPKI validation status to bypass checks.

2.4.2.2 Leveraging peer conflicts for ambiguity

High

Low

High

Creates conflicting route advertisements to confuse networks and evade detection.

2.4.2.3 Adaptive attack timing based on network monitoring

Very High

Low

Very High

Times attacks to avoid monitoring periods or response teams.

3.1.1.1 Initial access via TCP stack vulnerability

High

Medium

High

Uses TCP vulnerabilities to gain initial access to BGP routers.

3.1.1.2 Privilege escalation to BGP process

High

Low

High

Escalates privileges to manipulate BGP processes directly.

3.1.1.3 Persistent route manipulation

Medium

Low

Very High

Modifies BGP routes for long-term control or traffic diversion.

3.1.1.4 TCP-AO key material extraction

Very High

High

Very High

Extracts TCP-AO keys for future authentication bypass or session hijacking.

3.1.2.1 Distributed TCP sequence prediction

Very High

High

Very High

Coordinates multiple attackers to predict TCP sequences for BGP session hijacking.

3.1.2.2 Synchronized BGP session reset attacks

High

Medium

High

Coordinates resets of multiple BGP sessions to cause widespread routing instability.

3.1.2.3 Cross-platform exploitation campaigns

Very High

High

Very High

Targets multiple router platforms and BGP implementations for maximum impact.

3.2.1 ML-Generated Attack Traffic

Very High

High

Very High

AI generates attack traffic that evades detection and targets BGP specifically.

3.2.2 Autonomous hijack coordination

Very High

High

Very High

AI coordinates route hijacks across multiple networks autonomously.

3.2.3 Adaptive persistence mechanisms

Very High

High

Very High

AI adapts persistence techniques to maintain control despite countermeasures.

3.2.4 Evolutionary path optimization

Very High

High

Very High

AI optimizes BGP path manipulations for stealth and impact.

3.2.5 AI-enhanced TCP-AO cryptographic attacks

Very High

High

Very High

AI enhances cryptographic attacks against TCP-AO for authentication bypass.

3.3.1 Backdoored router firmware/images

High

High

Very High

Compromises firmware or images to introduce backdoors into BGP routers.

3.3.2 Malicious BGP optimization tools

High

Medium

High

Distributes tools that contain malware or vulnerabilities to compromise BGP operations.

3.3.3 Compromised network management software

High

Medium

High

Compromises software used to manage BGP networks for unauthorized access.

3.3.4 Pre-installed weak TCP-AO keys in vendor equipment

Medium

Low

High

Uses weak default keys installed by vendors to compromise BGP authentication.