Safety notes for cloud CTF labs¶
Running vulnerable cloud environments requires strict isolation and active monitoring to prevent accidental breaches or malicious abuse.
Dedicated cloud accounts (Non-prod)¶
Prevents accidental damage to real business resources and limits blast radius if credentials leak.
AWS: Create a new account under AWS Organizations (no payment methods attached).
GCP: Use a separate project with billing alerts ($0.01 threshold).
Azure: Set up a “Test” subscription with spending caps.
Example (AWS CLI):
# Create a new AWS account for labs (via Organizations)
aws organizations create-account --email "ctf-labs@yourdomain.com" --account-name "RootMe-Cloud-CTF"
Auto-destroy timers (Avoid cost leaks)¶
Stops forgotten labs from accumulating costs, and prevents long-term exposure of vulnerable resources.
AWS Lambda + CloudWatch: Schedule a termination function.
Terraform Auto-Destroy:
resource "null_resource" "destroy_after" {
triggers = {
always_run = timestamp() # Forces destroy-after to trigger
}
provisioner "local-exec" {
command = "sleep 7200 && terraform destroy -auto-approve" # 2-hour timeout
}
}
Alternative: Use AWS EventBridge to auto-terminate resources tagged CTF=true after 2 hours.
Abuse monitoring (Block malicious activity)¶
CTF labs attract attackers looking to mine crypto or host malware.
AWS GuardDuty: Enable and alert on:
Cryptocurrency:EC2/BitcoinTool.B!DNS
UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration
GCP Log Alerts: Monitor for:
compute.instances.create
from non-trusted IPsstorage.buckets.list
spikes (brute-force scanning)
Custom Scripts: Detect abnormal CPU usage (e.g., >90% for 10 mins = auto-shutdown).
Example (AWS CLI GuardDuty Alert):
aws guardduty create-detector --enable --finding-publishing-frequency FIFTEEN_MINUTES
Network isolation¶
Prevents lab compromises from spreading to other environments.
AWS: Use a dedicated VPC with no peering/NAT.
GCP: Enable VPC Service Controls to block exfiltration.
Azure: Apply NSGs blocking outbound traffic except to whitelisted IPs.
Example (AWS VPC Isolation):
resource "aws_vpc" "ctf_isolated" {
cidr_block = "10.0.0.0/16"
enable_dns_hostnames = false # Reduce attack surface
}
Credential hygiene¶
Leaked keys = compromised cloud org.
Short-Lived Creds: Use AWS STS AssumeRole (max 1-hour sessions).
GCP: Disable service account key creation (use Workload Identity).
Azure: Require MFA for all users.
Example (GCP Hardening):
# Disable service account key creation
gcloud iam deny-policy --organization=YOUR_ORG_ID \
--deny-all --identity='*' \
--permissions='iam.serviceAccountKeys.create'
Legal protection¶
CTF labs can be mistaken for real attacks.
AWS: Submit Penetration Testing Request.
GCP/Azure: Document lab IP ranges for abuse teams.
Add a “This is a CTF” banner to all web interfaces.
Checklist before launch¶
✅ Dedicated cloud account with billing alerts
✅ Terraform destroy-after timer (2-4 hours max)
✅ GuardDuty/Log Monitoring enabled
✅ Network isolation (no peering, egress filtering)
✅ Legal/abuse team notified